| Suppose that you and I walk into a room in which | | | | supernatural realm is problematic and usually of no |
| there are a bed, a chair, a small table with a vase | | | | real help in explaining matters. [Does this beg the |
| of flowers on the table. A quick visual and tactile | | | | question?] |
| inspection reveals nothing else in the room. We | | | | Is this really a neutral position? |
| both agree on this. [This could be taken as the | | | | Some apologists claim there is no neutral position. |
| 'neutral' position.] | | | | According to them, both the view of belief in a |
| I adopt this 'neutral' position as my philosophy: | | | | deity and non-belief require certain assumptions. |
| The room contains nothing but two people, a bed, | | | | Both positions require certain "faith"; i.e., |
| a chair, a table and a vase of flowers. Affirmation | | | | presumption that a belief system is true. |
| of this premise is consistent with me functioning | | | | Contrary to this, the rational skeptic will argue |
| well (even flourishing and thriving) in the room. | | | | that belief in a questionable entity requires |
| You, on the other hand, agree with me on the | | | | additional assumptions or basic faith, but omission |
| stated list of physical things in the room, but you | | | | of this belief does not. How would the argument |
| add another unseen, undetectable item, namely, a | | | | go? |
| spirit with whom you claim "interaction." This | | | | Let us start by admitting that, in order to make |
| 'interaction' makes your stay in the room easier | | | | sense of our world, people generally start with |
| and meaningful. It has pragmatic, psychological | | | | certain assumptions or presuppositions. Some |
| value for you. But you're unable to show me or | | | | examples are |
| others (who might join us in the room) that the | | | | the assumptions that generally the future will |
| spirit really exists. You cannot come up with any | | | | resemble the past (what we learned yesterday |
| objective, neutral evidence to support your belief. | | | | applies to today, and what we learn today |
| Who has the burden of "proving" his case? Is it | | | | generally will apply to tomorrow); |
| the theist who claims that an extraordinary entity | | | | that generally our perceptual experience is a |
| exists? (One example of an extraordinary entity | | | | good guide to things and happenings in our |
| is a supernatural being who relates in some ways | | | | environment; |
| to humanity and who is the ground for all reality,) | | | | that questionable claims must be supported |
| Or is it the non-theist (atheist, agnostic, skeptic) | | | | by empirical evidence or well-grounded reasoning. |
| who finds that there isn't any clear indication of | | | | that there is a difference between fact and |
| such an entity? | | | | fiction, common public reality, on the one hand, |
| What is at issue here? The issue concerns the | | | | and fantasy or hallucinations, on the other; |
| purported existence of an entity whose existence | | | | something like the "Law of the Excluded |
| has not been shown to be a public, common | | | | Middle"; no contradictions allowed: something |
| reality knowable by all, including disinterested, | | | | cannot both be and not be (in the same sense). |
| neutral parties. If the existence of the deity were | | | | There may be more; my list is just to give a |
| clear and well-grounded, there would be no issue, | | | | flavor of the "faith" of the secular rationalist. |
| and no need for arguments purporting to prove | | | | It is reasonable to say that the most ardent |
| the existence of the deity. Given that we do | | | | defender of religious faith shares these |
| have a legitimate issue for rational minds, the | | | | assumptions with the rational skeptic. In order for |
| burden of proof seems to fall on those who claim | | | | anyone to operate successfully in the world, he |
| that a deity in fact exists. But many disagree. | | | | must operate with assumptions (or unstated |
| Has anyone ever been able to provide | | | | presuppositions) much like these. Even believers in |
| unequivocal, objective evidence clearly supporting | | | | gods, angels, demons, and miracles do not accept |
| the proposition that a deity exists? Isn't the | | | | every claim that others make (especially when |
| burden of proof is on those who claim there is | | | | those claims oppose their basic beliefs); they apply |
| such evidence? Don't they have to show neutral, | | | | tests of empirical evidence and reason to them, |
| objective grounds for belief in a deity? | | | | and may even reject them on this basis. And |
| Where is the neutral position? | | | | such believers also routinely reject the fantasies |
| Many theists and the believers in religious | | | | of disturbed persons and the hallucinations of |
| orthodoxy will deny that they have the burden of | | | | drunkards and mentally impaired people. Hence, |
| proof because they see the neutral position as | | | | my claim that even believers in gods and demons |
| being neutral between both the existence and | | | | use assumptions stated in the third and fourth |
| non-existence of a deity. Accordingly, they argue | | | | bullets above. |
| that the skeptic has to make a case for | | | | It is a set of presuppositions like these that could |
| nonexistence, in light of the nearly universal belief | | | | be called the "shared faith" of our culture. But |
| in deity. | | | | such shared faith does not entail the beliefs of a |
| Of course, in a culture in which there is universal, | | | | theistic religion; nor does it entail that our |
| or nearly universal, belief in a deity, the skeptic or | | | | traditional religious beliefs are false. The "shared |
| non-theist stands out as a non-conformist; he is | | | | faith" is neutral between theism and positive |
| seen as standing outside the mainstream. In this | | | | atheism (the positive claim that there are no gods |
| context, most people might believe that the | | | | whatsoever). |
| burden of proof is on the skeptic to justify his | | | | But the naturalism of the rational skeptic does not |
| drastic non-conformity. On the other hand, those | | | | need any additional assumptions. A world view |
| who conform by affirming a deity do not have to | | | | that omits belief in a deity is an adequate world |
| prove anything. | | | | view. In the same sense the world view of most |
| But in a pluralistic culture like ours, in which a | | | | mature people that omits belief in Santa Claus (as |
| significant minority do not believe in a deity, and | | | | an actual individual) is an adequate world view. By |
| among those who do believe, there are varying | | | | "adequate" here I mean that the set of beliefs |
| concepts of deity and ambiguity regarding the | | | | are good enough to enable a successful, intelligent, |
| proposition that a deity exists, the burden of | | | | moral existence. |
| proof should not be on the skeptic. | | | | The world view of the rational skeptic is not as |
| So we have the common view that the skeptic | | | | non-conformist as our 'Christian' culture suggests. |
| must make a good case for non-existence of | | | | Millions of people in different cultures and historical |
| deity before the theistic position becomes | | | | periods have operated successfully on this basis. |
| questionable. Should we give the apologists such | | | | The fact that others in theistic, religious cultures |
| an advantage in the "god debate"? I think not. | | | | find it "impossible" to do the same does not show |
| I will argue for an alternative notion of the neutral | | | | that a naturalistic world view is not workable; it |
| position. The key is the naturalistic standpoint: We | | | | only shows that under certain cultural, historical |
| ordinarily explain events in nature and society | | | | conditions, entire cultures have been persuaded |
| without invoking the mysterious, unknowable | | | | that it is unworkable. |
| supernatural realm. Any reference to the | | | | |